Labor Market Distortions, Employment and Growth: The Recent Chilean Experience by Raphael Bergoeing et al.
Banco Central de Chile
Documentos de Trabajo
 






THE RECENT CHILEAN EXPERIENCE
Raphael Bergoeing Felipe Morandé Facundo Piguillem
                                                
 La serie de Documentos de Trabajo en versión PDF puede obtenerse gratis en la dirección electrónica:
http://www.bcentral.cl/esp/estpub/estudios/dtbc. Existe la posibilidad de solicitar una copia impresa con
un costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera de Chile. Las solicitudes se pueden hacer por
fax: (56-2) 6702231 o a través de correo electrónico: bcch@bcentral.cl.
Working Papers in PDF format can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/stdpub/studies/workingpaper. Printed versions can be ordered individually
for US$12 per copy (for orders inside Chile the charge is Ch$500.) Orders can be placed by fax: (56-2) 6702231
or e-mail: bcch@bcentral.cl.BANCO CENTRAL DE CHILE
CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE
La serie Documentos de Trabajo es una publicación del Banco Central de Chile que divulga
los trabajos de investigación económica realizados por profesionales de esta institución o
encargados por ella a terceros. El objetivo de la serie es aportar al debate de tópicos relevantes
y presentar nuevos enfoques en el análisis de los mismos. La difusión de los Documentos de
Trabajo sólo intenta facilitar el intercambio de ideas y dar a conocer investigaciones, con
carácter preliminar, para su discusión y comentarios.
La publicación de los Documentos de Trabajo no está sujeta a la aprobación previa de los
miembros del Consejo del Banco Central de Chile. Tanto el contenido de los Documentos de
Trabajo, como también los análisis y conclusiones que de ellos se deriven, son de exclusiva
responsabilidad de su o sus autores y no reflejan necesariamente la opinión del Banco Central
de Chile o de sus Consejeros.
The Working Papers series of the Central Bank of Chile disseminates economic research
conducted by Central Bank staff or third parties under the sponsorship of the Bank. The
purpose of the series is to contribute to the discussion of relevant issues and develop new
analytical or empirical approaches in their analyses. The only aim of the Working Papers is to
disseminate preliminary research for its discussion and comments.
Publication of Working Papers is not subject to previous approval by the members of the
Board of the Central Bank. The views and conclusions presented in the papers are exclusively
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Central Bank of Chile
or of the Board members.
Documentos de Trabajo del Banco Central de Chile
Working Papers of the Central Bank of Chile
Huérfanos 1175, primer piso.
Teléfono: (56-2) 6702475; Fax: (56-2) 6702231Documento de Trabajo Working Paper
N° 251 N° 251
LABOR MARKET DISTORTIONS, EMPLOYMENT
AND GROWTH: THE RECENT CHILEAN EXPERIENCE
Raphael Bergoeing Felipe Morandé Facundo Piguillem
Universidad de Chile Universidad de Chile
Cámara Chilena de la Construcción
Cámara Chilena de la Construcción
Resumen
Entre 1984 y 1997, Chile mostró una de las más altas tasas de crecimiento del mundo. En años
recientes, sin embargo, este decayó en forma sustancial. Este artículo analiza el rol de la acumulación
de factores y la eficiencia con que son usados, medida a través de la productividad total de factores
(PTF), para explicar el comportamiento de la actividad en Chile durante los últimos veinte años.
Contrastando con la experiencia de los años ochenta y comienzos de los noventa, en los últimos años
el principal causante de la desaceleración de la actividad no ha sido una menor PTF, sino una grave
caída del empleo. Mediante la calibración de un modelo dinámico de equilibrio general basado en el
modelo neoclásico de crecimiento, con fluctuaciones en el uso de factores inducidas por cambios en la
PTF  y en los precios relativos de los insumos, podemos concluir que un aumento de 6,17% en el
costo de contratación explica la caída observada del empleo. Esta, a su vez, se puede atribuir a un alza
del costo de los servicios laborales debida al importante aumento del salario mínimo ocurrido entre
1998 y 2000 y a la reforma de la ley laboral, intensamente debatida entre los años 1999 y 2002.
Abstract
The per capita growth rate of Chile from 1984 to 1997 was among the highest in the world. During
recent years, however, per capita growth dropped significantly. This paper discusses the role of factor
accumulation and the efficiency with which factors are used, measured as total factor productivity
(TFP), to explain the evolution of output in Chile during the past 20 years. In contrast with the
experience of the 1980s and early 1990s, in recent years the primary determinant of the drop in output
growth has not been a decline in TFP, but a severe fall in employment. Using a calibrated dynamic
general equilibrium model based on the neoclassical growth model, with fluctuations in factor inputs
induced by changes in TFP and relative input prices, we conclude that a 6.17% increase in the cost of
labor hiring replicates the observed fall in employment. This fall, in turn, could be attributed to a
perceived higher cost of labor services associated to both the significant increase in the minimum
wage observed between 1998 and 2000, and a labor code reform, intensively debated during the 1999-
2002 period.
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1.  Introduction
From 1984 to 1998, the Chilean economy grew at a rate of 5.4% per capita, that is,
among the world’s most successful economies in the past twenty years. This result can
undoubtedly be attributed to the market oriented structural reforms that took place during
the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. At first, however, this route was far from easy. As a
matter of fact, this substantial growth was preceded by a profound crisis in the early 1980s
that led to an accumulated decline in per capita output of around 20% for 1982-1983.
1 Chile
then grew steadily and, in 1990, it had once again reached its trend level.
2  In the years that
followed, the growth rate held steady at around 6%, bringing output per capita 30% higher
its 1980 trend level by 1998.
In the past few years, however, the Chilean economy has experienced a sharp drop
in its growth rate. Indeed, from 1998 to 2002, the per capita growth rate averaged a mere
0.63% per year. Different hypotheses have been argued to explain this period of stagnating
growth. In particular, analysts mention external factors associated with the decline in the
terms of trade and reduced access to external capital flows that started with the Asian crisis.
The recent recession affecting the world economy (which deteriorated further after the 11
September 2001 terrorist attack) is said to have contributed to worsening the outlook for the
terms of trade and dampening investor’s appetite for risk. Others argue that this fall could
be the result of the excessively restrictive monetary policy stance applied by the Central
Bank in mid-1998 to reduce the impacts of the Asian crisis that were just becoming
apparent at the time. The effects of this policy, combined with the direct impact of the
Asian crisis itself, may have proven more lasting and harder to turn around than originally
foreseen, even with the openly expansionary monetary policy applied for several quarters
now.
                                                                
1 The Chilean crisis of 1982-83 is considered one of the worst in the 20
th century. Kehoe and Prescott (2002)
provide evidence of this.
2 In this study we use output per working age population to analyze growth processes in the Chilean economy
and a 2% annual rate as trend. Output per working age population, that is, population from 16 to 64 years of
age, is the appropriate indicator for per capita output in the context of the theoretical economy we use. In this
economy the entire working age population is capable of working. Finally, the 2% rate used as a proxy for
trend growth corresponds to average annual growth in this variable from 1960-2002 in Chile.2
Meanwhile, however, others have argued that the country’s difficulties with
returning to growth rates like those of the past decade go beyond the explanations of a
normal cycle. In contrast, they suggest that recent results reveal a decline in the economy’s
potential for growing at more than 3 to 4% annually. Furthermore, until very recently, the
economy had proven unable to create new jobs at rates comparable to those previously
observed. Both phenomena, stagnant growth and low job creation, have coincided not only
with an external scenario that is extremely complex for emerging economies but also with a
range of policy actions, some of them legal reforms, which affect production costs. Among
these, two stand out: the 30% increase in the minimum wage implemented between 1998
and 2000, and the so-called “labor code reform”. The latter was passed in October 2001,
but its discussion began in the political sphere during the presidential election campaign in
late 1999 and it took almost two years of parliamentary debate. This debate left the
impression that the reform would make labor hiring costs much higher. Earlier, toward the
end of 2000, reforms to reduce tax evasion had been passed, and a little later, in mid-2001,
reforms to reduce the tax burden on individuals but gradually increase the burden on
companies were also approved. In an opposite direction, in late 2001 reforms to liberalize
the capital market were also passed that should, in the future, reduce investment and capital
costs.
The present article focuses on the third of these hypotheses, that is, that the decline
in growth and job creation is linked to changing production costs, mainly associated with
more expensive labor. With Bergoeing et al. (2002) and Bergoeing and Morandé (2002) as
our starting point, we go on to analyze the role of factor accumulation and efficiency with
which these factors are used during the past 20 years in Chile to understand output
fluctuations in the context of a simple neoclassical growth model. The analysis shows that,
unlike events during the crisis in the early 1980s as well as during the recovery and strong
economic growth phase that followed and lasted through 1998, in which the efficiency of
factor use was the main engine driving economic activity, in recent years the fall in
employment has been the primary determinant of the observed decline in growth.3
2. Growth Accounting
In the context of the neoclassical model, lower growth may be the result of a decline
in labor factor accumulation, due to changes in implicit or explicit taxes that make hiring
labor more expensive and thus, increase production costs. Evidence in Kehoe and Prescott
(2002) shows that most crises during the 20
th century were the consequence of drops in the
efficiency of factor use or labor contribution. In Chile from 1981 to 1998, the main source
of growth was the efficiency with which labor and capital were used; since then,
fluctuations in activity levels have resulted fundamentally from changes in employment.
To determine the contribution of factor accumulation and how efficiently these are
used to the change in output per working age population, we break down the change in the
latter by changes in total TFP, the capital to output ratio, and hours worked per person of
working age. This break down is based on a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function,
that is,





where Yt is output, Kt is capital, Lt is total hours worked and At is TFP. In this context,




t)                               (2)
When TFP grows at a constant rate, that is, when A t = Ag
(1-a)t, the neoclassical growth
model is characterized by a unique balanced growth path in which output and capital per
worker grow at the same constant rate, g-1. In this study we analyze the behavior of output
relative to this trend. The 2% trend in output per working age person used for Chile also fits
the United States data very well during most of the 20
th century. As argue by Kehoe and
Prescott (2002), we consider this trend growth as representing the world stock of useable
knowledge growing smoothly over time and being not country specific: countries differ in
their institutional structures.
Labor and output series are available directly from national accounts. To obtain A t,
however, we must choose a value for the capital share in output, a, and generate aggregate4
capital series, Kt.  Information from national accounts indicates that the labor compensation
share of Chile’s output is almost 0.50. This, in a competitive context, corresponds to 1-a,
so the capital share is 0.50. This fraction is stable over time and among many developing
countries. In developed countries, however, labor’s share is much higher, with a fluctuating
at around 0.30. Gollin (2002) shows that if we correct for labor’s share in developing
countries, to allow for the fact that independent workers are underestimated, labor’s
contribution rises significantly, tending toward levels observed in developed countries, that
is 0.70. A second reason for using this labor’s share and not the information from national
accounts is that in this case, the growth model predicts a marginal productivity for capital
that is unrealistically high.
3 In any case, and as the sensitivity exercises that appear in
Appendix 2 show, the results of this study would not be substantially different if we
assumed that a is close to the value arising from national accounts, for example, 0.45. The
fraction of output accorded to the labor factor only affects the distribution of changes in
output between TFP and capital, but does not affect the labor factor’s contribution, which is
the main element behind output’s behavior in the past four years. Because of this, and given
that this article centers precisely on the changes to production costs due to legal reforms,
particularly to labor laws, from now on we assume that a = 0.3.














































where Lt/ Nt is the number of hours available for work per person of working age.
4 We can
break this expression down to separate out changes in real output per working age
population for the period t and t+s, this way:
                                                                
3 If a=0.45, for example, the before-tax rate of return on capital would average 23 % from 1960-2002. With
a=0.30, however, this rate is 15%.
4 Nt is obtained by multiplying the population aged from 16 to 64 years by the number of hours available for
work in the year, assuming 100 hours per week for 52 weeks. L t corresponds to the number of people working
in Chile for the average number of hours worked in Greater Santiago. This breakdown is based on Hayashi

























































































The first term on the right hand side of the equation represents the contribution of
TFP to growth, while the second term is the contribution from changes in the capital-output
ratio, and the third term is the contribution from changes in hours worked per person of
working age. In the long term, the empirical evidence reveals that both the capital-output
ratio and employment remain constant. In the short term, however, factor accumulation can
be very important to growth.
Table 1 provides the breakdown described above of output per working age
population – referred to, from now on, as per capita output – for the Chilean economy from
1980 to date. These data reveal that for the past four years, unlike during the period of
sustained growth from 1983 to 1998, employment has been the most relevant factor behind
the level of economic activity.
5 This variable explains an average annual decline in per
capita output of around 2.31%.
6 Per capita output, however, rose 0.63% per year on average
during this period, due to the fact that TFP was 1.51%, with the capital-output ratio
contributing 1.42% during this period. In previous years, however, TPF appears to have
been the main determinant of growth.
Alternative calculations for the growth accounting shown in Table 2 confirm our
main finding, namely, that during the last four years the drop in output per capita is mostly
explained by a fall in the contribution of labor. This result is robust to different
specification for capital and labor. In effect, if we use capital utilization instead of capital
stock or number of workers instead of hours worked, our results remain qualitatively
unchanged.
                                                                
5 During the crisis in the early 1980s, employment and TFP account for similar percentage drops in per capita
output.
6 Note that we are using a logarithmic approximation for growth. This allows us to carry out an additive
decomposition of growth factors.6
3. Deterministic Growth Model
In this section, we will use a simple deterministic version of the neoclassical growth
model. This model considers a single good that is consumed or used in investment.
The representative household solves the following problem:
( ) ( ) [ ]
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where Ct is consumption, Nt - Lt is leisure, rt is the real return on capital before taxes, wt is
the real wage, tt
l is the labor tax rate, tt
k is the tax on net capital minus depreciation and Tt
is a transfer that the government pays the consumer. Moreover, b ˛ (0,1) is the discount
factor and d is the depreciation rate.
The representative firm solves the problem:
t t t t t t t L w K r L K A - - = P -a a 1
t max  (6)
The government’s problem is to balance its budget, that is,  
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Finally, the equilibrium requires market clearing:
The consumer problem is characterized by a condition requiring intertemporal
optimization for consumption and an intratemporal consumer-leisure optimization
condition represented, respectively, by the following equations:
( ) (8)                                                                   1 1
1 t t t t t t t Y L K A K K C = = - - + -
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a a d7
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The problem of firms is characterized by conditions of equality between marginal
productivity and factor prices,
t
t
t t t t K
Y
L K A r a a a a = = - - 1 1 (11)
( ) ( )
t
t
t t t t L
Y
L K A w a a a a - = - = - 1 1 (12)
Equations (7)-(12)  are necessary and sufficient to completely characterize the
equilibrium. To simulate the model, we must parameterized our theoretical economy. The
parametric specification used is given by b = 0.98, d = 0.05 and g = 0.28. The discount
factor and the depreciation rate have been specified using the values typically assigned in
the literature. The parameter for labor disutility, g, was calibrated according to equation
(13), assuming zero labor tax and considering an average value for the 1960-1998 period
consistent with data for consumption, employment and output. Therefore, this parameter
implicitly includes distortions associated with the labor market. This parameter is
consistent, moreover, with those reported by McGrattan (1994) for the United States and
Bergoeing and Soto (2002) for Chile. In the next section, in order to evaluate the
plausibility of an increase in distortions in the consumption-leisure decision, associated
with the labor market policies, the labor tax for equation (13) is calibrated so as to replicate
employment’s behavior during the 1998-2002 period in Chile. The capital tax is calibrated
in equation (14), given b and d.
( )( )
l
t t t t t
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(14)
Finally, note that in our model, Ct corresponds to total private and governmental
consumption and exports.
4. Simulations
This section uses the growth model described above to analyze how relevant
changes in factor prices resulting from distorting tax policies were in determining Chile’s
economic growth over recent years. To do so, we carry out five simulation exercises. Each
consists of simulating the model from 1980 to infinity using actual values for TFP and
different values for taxes, associated with unexpected reforms. Thus, we report the impacts
of TFP, the capital-output ratio, and the employment-population of working age ratio on
growth for the 1980-2002 period, in a manner consistent with the growth accounting
breakdown presented in the previous section.
7 Specifically, the first simulation consists of
solving the equilibrium incorporating a capital tax of 49%, for the entire period under
analysis. The second simulation takes into consideration the income tax reforms
implemented in Chile in the mid-1980s. This is simulated assuming that the capital tax falls
from 49% to 18% starting in 1987.
8 These values have been calibrated for the periods 1960-
1980 and 1987-2002, respectively, according to the consumption-investment decision
implicit in the data, that is, using equation (14). By assuming that the decline in the capital
tax rate is unexpected, the equilibrium for the first six years of the simulation remains
unchanged. It is interesting to point out that income tax rates actually implemented in Chile
consisted of reducing this tax from 45% to 10% in 1985 and than raising it to 15% in 1991.
As a result, the capital tax rates calibrated from the data using equation (14), although they
                                                                
7 From 2003 on, it is assumed that TFP grows at the same average rate as it did from 1960-2002.
8 Although the reform started in 1985, it wasn’t completely implemented until 1989.9
represent the set of distortions implicit in the consumption data, are surprisingly similar to
the rates actually observed during this period.
The third exercise is perhaps the most interesting of all, for the purpose of this
article: it assumes that the debate about changes to labor legislation that started in 1999 and
the significant hike in the minimum wage increased the likelihood of labor becoming more
expensive, which in the model is expressed as a hiring tax. This tax is calibrated so as to
replicate the decline in employment’s contribution to growth as observed in the previous
four years and is maintained from then on.
Two final exercises consist of calibrating the capital tax and TFP for the 1998-2002
period respectively so as to replicate the observed decline in employment (and so assuming
away the hiring tax of the third exercise).
Results indicate that:
(1) The simulation of an economy without capital tax reform significantly
underestimates output growth from 1983 to 1998 and over-estimates it for the next
four years. The main reason for this underestimation from 1983 to 1998 is that the
drop in the capital-output ratio and employment is overestimated. During the past
four years, however, the opposite occurs: the model underestimates the increase in
capital and the drop in the fraction of total hours worked. The fall in employment is
so dramatic that it ends up overestimating output growth by about 1.9% during this
period.
(2) By incorporating the capital tax reform, results for the 1983-1998 period improve
significantly. Now, capital falls almost as in the data and  employment is
underestimated by 0.7 percentage points less than before. However, for the 1998-
2002 period the increase in output is overestimated, mainly because the model
doesn’t capture the fall observed in employment.
(3) Because of this, simulations 3 and 4 apply increases in taxes to employment and
capital, respectively, to replicate the behavior observed in employment. These10
exercises seek to provide evidence of the plausibility of the hypothesis that higher
production costs may be responsible for the lower growth observed in Chile in the
recent past. These simulations demonstrate that a 6.17% (up from zero) labor tax or
a 35,2% (up from 18%) capital tax can produce this effect. The second tax,
however, while it does provide a closer approximation of output’s performance, it
does so at the cost of worsening the overall prediction. In particular, the unreformed
model from 1999 overestimates the fall in the capital contribution, so that with a
higher capital tax the model simulation worsens even more.
(4) Finally, we simulate our economy imposing a TFP during the 1998-2002 period as
to replicate the observed fall in employment. The rationale for this exercise is that
TFP may be missmeasured due to unobserved shocks to the economy. This
simulation shows that a fall in TFP as the one considered generates a deep fall in
output per capita, similar to that observed in 1981-1983, while the data show that,
although slightly, output per worker actually increased during the period.
So, in the end, the labor tax option appears to be the most plausible explanation for
what has occurred in Chile in recent years. This labor tax could be the result of higher
hiring costs perceived by economic agents, as a result of both the large increase in the
minimum wage between 1998 and 2000 and the debate surrounding labor reforms
9. By
raising the relative price of labor, this perception  was apparently enough to generate a
significant drop in short-term growth in Chile.
10 In 1992, labor markets had also being
reformed in Chile, mostly by raising the cost of firing, as the number of monthly wages
required to be paid to a fired worker were increased. Labor did not fall, however, as it did
during the last four years. The macroeconomic scenario, however, was dramatically
different, as the economy was growing at a much faster rate and capital inflows were
booming.
                                                                
9 The effect of the minimum wage on the employment fall in 1999 and 2000 is also documented in Cowan et.
al (2003) using a very different approach.
10 Beyer (2001) finds that the expected cost of lay-off associated with the new labor structure would rise by
about 16%.11
We have modeled the higher cost of labor hiring as a  result of several labor market
distortions associated with the observed debate on the labor code and actual increases in
minimum wages occurred in Chile during the 1999-2002 period. Our simulations
incorporate the higher cost of labor fully as in 1999 however. Next, we show that if we
simulate this policy distortion as perceived to happen some periods into the future, the
needed increases in the cost of labor to replicate the observed fall in employment are
smaller. Table 4 shows the required tax to replicate the observed fall in employment when
agents expect in 1999 that the labor code reform is implemented at different periods in the
future. This simulation is intended to capture the timing of the discussion generated in
Chile during the period and the uncertainty with respect to the period in which the authority
would implement the labor reform. Our results show, however, that the further away in the
future the labor reform is expected, the lower is the labor tax required to match the fall in
employment. In a dynamic general equilibrium model with no frictions, agents substitute
intertemporally to optimize. Since the  reform  is expected to start being binding in the
future, firms decide to temporally increase their hiring of labor until their labor costs
effectively increases.
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium paths of employment for alternative scenarios with
respect to the date when the reform is expected to be fully in place. The thin continuous line
reflects the actual data for the proportion of hours worked between 1998 and 2002, while
the thick line indicates the simulated path in the economy without labor taxes. The
remaining lines show the employment paths calibrated for labor reforms implemented at
alternative dates in the future. The figure shows that if the reform is expected to be binding
in the future, the simulated economies with the required taxes, although matching the
average fall in employment for the period, generate a reduction in employment that occurs
later that it actually occurred. Moreover, and consistent with Table 4, the further away the
reform is expected the lower is the required increase in the cost of labor needed to match
the fall in employment.
  These results crucially depend on the assumption of fully flexibility of labor markets
until the reform is effectively implemented. Another possibility is that labor markets have
frictions – as a result of firing costs, for instance – so that even though the reform is
expected several years in the future, the fall in employment is observed in the present. This12
possibility is not considered here since our simulations shown in Table 3, where the reform
is assumed to be expected immediately and markets are fully flexible, generate the same
equilibrium than the one obtained in an economy with reforms expected in the future but
rigidities binding in the present.
The model used simplifies reality in several dimensions, one of which is potentially
relevant to our analysis. By using a closed economy for our model, we do not explicitly
take into account the effect of changes in the terms of trade or other external variables that
may be relevant in the case of a small, open economy like Chile’s. These variables,
however, mainly affect what is referred to here as TFP, that is, the residual that remains
after considering the accumulation of labor and capital (i.e., al other input factors).
11 What
the data for the past four years show, however, is that the decline in employment, rather
than TFP, was the dominant element behind trends in per capita output. Moreover, our
exercises include actual TFP, thus capturing the impact of the terms of trade on output. In
this context, the relationship between growth and employment is not dependent on the
assumption of a closed economy. Finally, the last simulation shown in Table 3 indicates
that generating the observed fall in employment assuming as the only source of declining a
fall in TFP, induces changes in output per capita and capital to output that are inconsistent
with the observed patterns. The model simulates a fall in either variable while the data
show that both of them increased.
5. Conclusions
This study suggests that the decline in economic activity in Chile during recent
years may have been the result of the greater cost of hiring labor perceived by economic
agents, here simulated as a labor tax of 6.17%. An interpretation of this result is that the
perception of a higher cost of hiring was due to a combination of both the substantive
increase in the minimum wage between 1998 and 2000 and the debate surrounding the
                                                                
11 In Appendix 3 we demonstrate that in our closed economy model fluctuations in the terms of trade are
captured by the TFP parameter, At. As a matter of fact, by comparing 1983-1998 with the past three years, we
see that contribution of TFP to per capita growth fell by almost 50%. This fall is undoubtedly the result,
among other factors, of the lower terms of trade apparent since 1998.13
labor code reform that started in 1999. The final bill passed in Congress in October 2001
did include provisions that actually increase the cost of hiring.
Although to establish a connection between the recently observed fall in
employment in Chile and the perception of an increase in the hiring cost of labor needs to
be analyzed further, this study shows that small expected changes in relatives input prices
may generate large substitution of inputs used, causing a detriment in short-term economic
growth. If the expected increases in input prices remain in time, the fall in economic
activity may end up reducing long-run growth.14
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Appendix 1: Description and data sources
For the 1981-2002 period: The source for the Gross Domestic Product series was
the Central Bank of Chile. The investment series used came from gross capital formation
and inventory changes in the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial
Statistics. Capital was generated using the investment series corrected for the assumed
depreciation rate. The working age population corresponds to people from 16 to 64 years of
age, as reported by the World Development Indicator. Employment series are from the
National Statistics Bureau (INE). Finally, total hours worked were calculated using
employment per average hours worked in urban Santiago, according to results from the
employment and unemployment survey carried out by the University of Chile’s economics
department.
For the 1998-2002 robustness simulations in Table 2: we use employment from INE and
capital utilization form the Central Bank of Chile.17
Appendix 2: Alternative Simulation
Table 5 provides the results of growth accounting for the data and for each of the
five simulation exercises presented in Table 3, assuming a = 0.45. Simulations were carried
out using b = 0.98, d = 0.05 and g = 0.33. Capital tax rates, calibrated in equation (14), were
in this case tt
k = 0.71 until 1986 and tt
k = 0.53 from 1987 on. The labor tax that replicates
employment’s contribution (fall) in the past three years is  tt
l  = 0.0469.
As with the previous case, simulations 1 and 2, that is, those without tax reforms,
considerably underestimate growth in output per adult of working age during the period of
sustained growth and overestimate this output during the period beginning in 1998. The
capital tax reform that began in 1987 allows us to replicate the factor accumulation process
observed in the data with greater accuracy. Finally, the labor tax rate necessary to replicate
actual employment trends from 1998-2002 is almost equal to the result of the simulation
exercise reported in Table 1.
From the qualitative point of view, therefore, the results reported in Table 5 do not
differ from those presented in Table 3. The sole difference lies in the relevance of capital
and TFP in each case. Nonetheless, and as mentioned above, a=0.45 isn’t just implausible
from the empirical perspective according to Gollin (2002), but moreover suggests an annual
before-tax return on capital averaging 23% from 1960-2002. This rate of return is too high.18
Appendix 3: Terms of trade and TFP in a closed economy growth accounting.
Assume  a small open economy that produces two types of goods: exportable and
importable. The aggregate production function in terms on importable goods would be:
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where KMt and LMt are employment and capital in the importable sector while  KXt and
LXt are the same for the exportable sector. Pt
X is the exportable – importable relative price
(terms of trade) which is exogenously determined since the economy is assumed to be
small. To calculate TFP as in equation (2) , that is, assuming that there is only one good, the
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where Kt = KMt + KXt is aggregate capital stock measured in terms of the importable good
and  L t = LMt + LXt is total employment expressed in hours of work. Then, equation (16)
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Equation (17) shows that the changes in TFP estimated under this assumption does
not only include the actual changes in the productivity level in the economy (given by  A t
M
and A t
X) , but also: (a) the efficiency gains or losses due to input reallocations  (measured
by wt
M and wt
X); and (b) the changes in terms of trade.19
Table 1









1981-1983 -10.93 -7.81 5.26 -8.38
1983-1998 4.76 3.36 -0.34 1.73
1998-2002 0.63 1.51 1.42 -2.3120
Table 2









Base case 0.63 1.51 1.42 -2.31
Number of people 0.63 1.04 1.06 -1.61
Capital utilization and
number of people
0.63 1.29 0.81 -1.6121
Table 3




















-10.94 -9.20 -9.20 -9.20 -9.20 -9.20
Due to TFP -7.81 -7.81 -7.81 -7.81 -7.81 -7.81
Due to K/Y 5.25 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60
Due to L/N -8.38 -6.98 -6.98 -6.98 -6.98 -6.98
83-98 Change in
Y/N
4.76 2.80 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05
Due to TFP 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36
Due to K/Y -0.34 -1.12 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33
Due to L/N 1.73 0.56 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
98-02 Change in
Y/N
0.63 2.53 1.81 0.74 0.20 -6.72
Due to TFP 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51 -8.02
Due to K/Y 1.42 1.11 1.28 1.54 0.99 3.60
Due to L/N -2.31 -0.72 -0.98 -2.31 -2.31 -2.31
Notes: Simulation 1, our base case, considers a capital tax and no reforms. Simulation 2 includes a capital tax
reform reducing it to 18% as of 1987. Simulation 3 adds to simulation 2 a labor tax of 6.17% as of 1999.
Simulation 4 adds to simulation 2 a capital tax increase to 35.16% as of 1999.  Finally, simulation 5 replicates
the exercise in simulation but imposing a TFP during the 1998-2002 period as to replicate the observed fall in
employment. The annual fall in TFP that replicates the observed fall in employment is 5.6%.22
Table 4









Tax 6.17 5.80 5.58 5.2123
Table 5




















-10.94 -10.15 -10.15 -10.15 -10.15 -10.15
Due to TFP -12.58 -12.58 -12.58 -12.58 -12.58 -12.58
Due to K/Y 10.03 10.20 10.20 10.20 10.20 10.20
Due to L/N -8.38 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76
83-98 Change in
Y/N
4.76 2.08 3.86 3.86 3.86 3.86
Due to TFP 3.66 3.66 3.66 3.66 3.66 3.66
Due to K/Y -0.64 -2.19 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99
Due to L/N 1.73 0.60 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18
98-02 Change in
Y/N
0.63 1.12 1.46 0.80 0.26 -8.02
Due to TFP 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 -13.60
Due to K/Y 2.71 1.66 2.53 2.88 2.34 7.90
Due to L/N -2.31 -1.04 -1.29 -2.31 -2.31 -2.31
Notes: Simulation 1, our base case, considers a capital tax and no reforms. Simulation 2 includes a capital tax
reform reducing it to 53% as of 1987. Simulation 3 adds to simulation 2 a labor tax of 4.69% as of 1999.
Simulation 4 adds to simulation 2 a capital tax increase to 60.35% as of 1999.  Finally, simulation 5 replicates
the exercise in simulation 4 but imposing a TFP during the 1998-2002 period as to replicate the observed fall
in employment.24
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